PEACEBUILDING: THE RELATIONAL DIMENSION OF THE THREE-POINTS-AGENDA
OF DELTA STATE GOVERNMENT,
NIGERIA (2007 – 2015)

BY

MATHIAS JARIKRE
Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution
School of Arts and Social Sciences
National Open University of Nigeria
Lagos, Nigeria
Telephone: +234-8034814803
MAIL: jarikremathias@yahoo.co.uk;

SUMMARY
The phenomenon of political agenda setting after it has been converted into votes in an election often explain government thought and practice of adopting priorities. In Nigeria, the dramatic increase of agenda setting at the national, state and local government levels has instituted a new paradigm "dividend of democracy". The critical valence is that each regime has consistently adopted the salience of policy priority in territorializing the governable space. To this end, the paper critically examines how agenda are identified, defined and why more attention is allocated to some problem than others. Using a peacebuilding lens, this article examines the interrelatedness of the three-point-agenda of Delta State, Nigeria, in order to formulate concrete suggestions in peacebuilding perspective. The study concludes that, the confluence of the three-point agenda is peacebuilding. Thus, the appraisal of the peace and security, human capital development and infrastructural development enhances knowledge of peacebuilding in relation to political agenda-setting.

INTRODUCTION
Across the globe, agenda setting has increasingly become influential and fertile paradigms in public policy and media/communications research (Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2006; Jennings & Miron, 2004) and has also assumed prime policy priority in the context of election or in otherwise political contexts. In Nigeria, this reality is not limited to the democratic rule as the military juntas in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, used agenda setting in public policy to gain relevance and recognition as well as stimulate the people's participation. Some of such public policies included the *Green Revolution and Operation Feed the Nation (OFN)* by the Federal Military Government, *School to land* by the military authority in Rivers State, *War Against Indiscipline (WAI)* and the *Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)* by the Mohammadu Buhari and Ibrahim Babangida regimes respectively. However, there is a renaissance of some sort since the commencement of the fourth Republic in 1999, as successive administrations/regimes appear to adopt an agenda as a slogan. For instance, the Obasanjo administration set the pace with *National Economic Empowerment and*

Development Strategy (NEEDS) and the succeeding regime headed by the Late President Yar' Dua adopted a seven–point agenda based on his popular rule of law declared during his inauguration speech on 29 May, 2007. The successor President Jonathan in 2010 after the death of Yar'Adua collapsed the seven-point agenda into the subsisting transformation agenda.

Walgrave, Soroka and Nuytemanss (2008:2), drawing from the works of Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1995; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005, defined political agenda as "the list of issues to which political actors pay attention." They further stated that "determining the agenda is a necessary precondition for almost any kind of political decision" (Walgrave et al., 2008:2). However, Kingdon (1995:3) explains that "the agenda-setting process narrows this set of conceivable subjects to the set that actually becomes the focus of attention". For Schattschneider (1975), focusing on the way conflict within a democratic government is exploited is a means to establishing priorities within a competitive, democratic system.

Two types of agenda setting have been identified they include symbolic and substantive political agenda (Pritchard & Berkowitz, 1993; Walgrave and van Aelst, 2006; Walgrave, Soroka & Nuytemans, 2008). Symbolic agenda does not depict policy consequences but buttresses the care and worry about issues by political actors, who do not propose or lack competence to initiate, concrete policies measures (Walgrave, et al, 2008). Substantive political agenda on the other hand are tangible because they deal with issues of law making, budgetary allocations, sanctions, nomination, etc. The three point agenda of Delta State government is a mix of symbolic and substantive political agenda.

A number of social theories can be identified to be relevant to the research on agenda setting. One of such theories is John Kingdon's theory of agenda setting which explains the creation of windows of opportunity through the interaction of 'problems, policies and politics' that are independent streams but converged at critical times to move issues onto decision agenda (Kingdon, 1995:166). This theory underscores the nexus between agenda setting and generation of policy alternatives, whereby policy provides windows of opportunity to support change.

Scholars from diverse disciplines have approached the discourse of political agenda setting from various perspectives. Much of the scholarly literature (Jones & Baumgartners, 2005; Kingdon, 1995; Wanta & Foote, 1994; Kleinnijenhuis, 2003; Soroka, 2002) on agenda setting is overwhelmingly dominated by the role of mass media and oriented on United States of America based studies. Other studies (Bailer 2004, Burns 2004, Dostal 2004, Selck and Steunenberg 2004, Pollack 2003, Tallberg 2003, Wagner 2003, Peters 2001, Mazey 1998, Smyrl 1998, Princen & Rhinard) have focused explicit attention on European Union agenda setting dynamics. Thus, there is a dearth of works about whether and to what extent political agenda setting have on conflict prone societies and peacebuilding outcomes in post conflict societies such as Delta State, in peacebuilding perspectives. The present study is an attempt aimed at contributing to filling such gaps.

This article explores the way public policy agenda contributes to peacebuilding in a conflict prone and post conflict society. It therefore, formulates a relational framework between the political agenda setting and peacebuilding outcomes, to understanding

the dynamics, which remains strong incentives for both scholars and practitioners. Using a peacebuilding lens, the study examines the three-points-agenda of the Delta State Government - Security and peace, human capital development and infrastructure development. The article first further focuses on how problems are identified and defined; why should more attention be allocated to some social problem than others and why is the public and governmental response to some problems different from what it is for other problems.

Conceptual and Relational Discourse of Peacebuilding
The conceptual formation of peacebuilding as a term has an intellectual foundation associated with the works of Johan Galtung. The field of peacebuilding as an aggregate concept did not originate out of a central place (Schirch, 2008:2). It is a multifaceted and multi-dimensional concept and exercise involving a wider range of actors, instruments and activities. The existing literature in peacebuilding is both diverse and open ended, some assuming broad spectrum while other have limited outcome that is based on narrow aspects of peacebuilding. The concept of peacebuilding depicts an academic license whereby its meaning is derived from the scholar's or practitioner's vintage position, outcome and understanding of post conflict interventions. However, an analytical perspective of transformative peacebuilding should depend on some form of generalization that captures the multifaceted and complex dispositions of a broad social participation. The plethora of literature on the various issues and themes in the field of peacebuilding underpin the conceptual evolution and development pattern of peacebuilding from the narrow meaning of political reconciliation to cover a broad spectrum of activities and sectors which include security and development

The currency of peacebuilding in the international domain is attributed to the unveiling of *An Agenda for Peace* to the United Nations Security Council by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who in 1992, introduced the term into the UN lexicon. He defined peacebuilcing as action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict… If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:21). Since then, scholars, civil society and NGOs, governments, international and regional organizations, ad hoc criminal tribunals, truth and reconciliation commissions and Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General as well as academics have been actively engaged in post conflict activities described as peacebuilding. These activities include the search for strategic measures in the form of programmmes, policies and practices to reduce the spectre of violent conflicts in various regions of the world as well as forestall the renewal of hostilities. Schirch (2005) drawing from different concepts and a wider spectrum of working definitions by major development organizations conceived as peacbuilding activities defined the concept in her book, *The Little Book of Strategic Peacebuilding* as follows: Peacebuilding seeks to prevent, reduce, transform, and help people recover from violence in all forms, even structural violence that has not yet led to massive civil unrest. At the same time it empowers people to foster relationships that sustain peace and their environment (cited in Schirch, 2008:11).

Schirch's broad definition underscores the strategic nature and the complexity of multiple tasks and approaches involved in building peace. Thus, "peacebuilding is strategic when resources, actors, and approaches are coordinated to accomplish multiple goals and address multiple issues for the long-term" (Schirch, 2008:8). It is in this sense that this paper intend to view the goals and outcomes of the three-point agenda of security and peace, human capital and infrastructural development with the lens of peacebuilding.

Without a doubt, the UN conceptualization of peacebuilding since Boutros Ghali's definition has stimulated discourses that challenge and draw out critical issues that depict contending positions among scholars, organizations, practitioners and donor agencies. The key document and foundational decision by the UN on peacebuilding is *An Agenda for Peace*. It has obviously stimulated increased interaction between peace and issues related to development, democratization and human security (Tschirgi 2004:2). Thus, the various review efforts by the UN to provide a normative framework for peacebuilding expanded the scope from the original concept to describe strategic plans to assist societies recovering violent conflict to preventive action and what types of activities it involves. It is in this sense that Reychler (1997:6) description of pre conflict peacebuilding becomes apt "preventive measures that aim to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor; to promote and implement human rights and the rights of the minorities, and to promote durable development and the realization of a just and fair social order in which there is no discrimination based on race or sex". The normative framework that began in 1990s incorporated security agenda that broadened to include human security, justice, reconciliation, good governance, and rule of law as essential components of peacebuilding.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, a range of issues that raised questions on security status were brought to the fore. Perhaps, the more challenging issues to scholars and policy formulators were those of primary referent of security and which capacity to build. A point to note is that during the Cold War two distinct sets of frameworks were established to address basic human needs (socio-economic development) and state needs (security oriented). The issues of security and development were treated separately. But the end of the Cold war ushered in a new vista of conflict that dictated international priorities. Peace therefore became a fleeting illusion due to intense insecurity, ethnic conflicts and genocide, widespread suffering, deadly violence with overwhelming civilian death and casualty, increase in refugee and displaced population across borders, especially in Africa. This made it necessary to revisit the issue of security and development at all levels with the intent to design a peacebuilding perspective that integrates security and development through coherent policy instrument and programmes to address violent conflicts. Thus, the point where security and development meet to kiss in order to 'cause, perpetuate, prevent or manage violent conflict is the appropriate terrain for peacebuilding" (Tschirigi, 2003:2).

At the centre of the debate were two schools of thought - neo-realist or structural and postmodernist or critical approach to the "new security thinking. As Jarikre (2012) opine that, the neo-realist and postmodernist thrusts to the security discourse have never denied the reality or assumption that the state has a primary role to play without

unnecessarily isolating the non-state actors but to set them hand in glove to achieve world peace and security. The neo-realist or structural approach posit that the prevalent Cold War approach to security which is preponderantly on military approach was simple minded and have undermined the conceptual discourse of security (Buzan, 1991:435). Hans Morgenthau, R. Niebuhr and Herbert Butterfield amongst major proponents of the realist's point of view confined security within the ambit of state capacity to deter or defeat aggressors. The critical theorists otherwise known as the postmodernist approach to human security, on the other hand argue that security in all ramifications strides beyond military determination of threat (Booth, 1994:4). Accordingly, they have tenaciously advanced the dislocation of state supremacy in pursuit of "multi-track diplomacy" as a broad strategy to achieve human security and peace. Broadly speaking, the preponderance of this approach is ultimately designed to underscore the relative preference of human security to state security, summarized in the words of Booth (1994:4) "human security is ultimately more important than state security". In theory and practice, the neo-realist approach to security places premium on human security and state security as a twain referent of security. Thus, state and human security are mutually supportive (Hubert, 2001:163).

The conceptual introduction of human security into peace and security lexicon by scholars and practitioners is predicated on the need for "a comprehensive and sustainable view of peace and security with emphasis on 'root causes' of conflicts, structural shift beyond that of 'absence of war' human protection and development" (UN Report, 2009:4). According to Richmond (2007), "security is far more complex than traditional realist and liberal approaches would have it, and human security, while not necessarily providing theoretical simplicity, at least opens up the debate about what would be needed for a humanist, free-standing, and self-sustaining peace" (Richmond, 2007:465). The human security paradigm in peacebuilding is based on the theory of human development which recognizes the interdependence between security and development (Katja, 2007:6). This is in relation to "safety from chronic threat such as hunger, disease, and repression as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruption in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes or in communities" (UNDP, 1995:23). The emphasis, therefore, was how peacebuilding can address human insecurity located at the structural, institutional, and personal (individual) levels of society.

Human Security
The conceptual introduction of human security into peace and security lexicon by scholars and practitioners began soon after the *United Nations Development Programme Report* of 1994. A corollary to this is the attempt at broadening the concept through the work of the *Commission on Human Security*, which was established at the United Nations Millennium Summit held in 2000. Human security as an interrelated concept with peacebuilding is also relatively new because state centred security has in many respects, given way to an entirely new concept (Klingebiel, 2006:1).

The reconfiguration of post international world and global governance institution at the end of the Cold War and the emergent security imperatives led to the search for a

new security paradigm. The search opened up the debate on the broad spectrum of security in its subjective nature in relation to peacebuilding along the neorealist and postmodernist approaches. Much of the literature on security in relation to the concept of peacebuilding underscored the relative preference of human security to state security in that "human security is ultimately more important than state security" (Booth, 1994:4). The works of radical scholars like Wilkins (1999); Nef (1999); King and Murray (2000) and Buzan (1991) represent the most relevant departure from and opposition to state centric approaches in favour of human security. A plethora of literature which seek to explain the nexus between human security and development in theoretical terms have not been adequately explained or analysed. Prominent among these works are Mark Duffield, Necla Tschirgi, Clive Robinson, Jackie Cilliers and Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, all in the volume of Stephen Klingebiel (2006) *New Interfaces between security and Development: Changing Concepts and approaches*. However, Richmond (2007:465) contends that "security is far more complex than traditional realist and liberal approaches would have it, and human security, while not necessarily providing theoretical simplicity, at least opens up the debate about what would be needed for a humanist, free-standing, and self-sustaining peace". Similarly, Klingebiel (2006:7) posits that "the debate on human security has, however, produced greater clarity in the terminology and above all, the various premises (individual and state security)".

The trend of the debate on the relationship between peacebuilding and the notion of human security found a common ground in that human security is centered on the protection of individuals. Beyond this consensus lies the divergent views that sustained the confusion about what threat should the individual be protected from. Two schools of thought can be identified from the literature; the first which is narrower in its concept formed the basis of their argument on violent threat to individual to expound the ideals of *Human Security Report,* based on "poverty, lack of state capacity and various forms of socio-economic and political inequity" (*Human Security Report*): The second is conceptualized on a broad based human security. Drawing from the 1994 *UNDP Human Development Report,* and the 2003 *Report of Commission on Human Security,* it argued that for peacebuilding to attain its goal of human security, it must integrate broader development strategy to include "hunger, disease, and natural disaster because these kill far more people than war, genocide and terrorism combined" (History- Peacebuilding Initiative web page). Hence both approaches are complimentary and culminated in the redefinition of traditional understanding of security and peace which have ultimately "informed the evolution of peacebuilding thinking" (History- Peacebuilding Initiative web page).

In a related discourse, Conteh-Morgan (2005) underscores the relevance of constructive approach to better understanding of current efforts of peacebuilding in post-war societies and argues that human security at the personal, institutional and structural-cultural levels can be more effectively realized in the process of peacebuilding. According to him:

> Peacebuilding with a view to alleviating human insecurity involves transforming the socio-economic and political environment that fosters intolerable inequality, engenders historical grievances, and nurtures

> *adversarial interactions. This may mean the development of social, political, and economic infrastructures that produce tolerable inequality and/or prevent future violence. (Conteh-Morgan 2005:72)*

The argument, therefore, is to take into account how infrastructure development and human capacity development can address human insecurity located at the structural, institutional, and personal (individual) levels of society.

Development and Peacebuilding

Two prominent groups whose thoughts are discernible in the debate on the nexus between development and peacebuilding are the exclusivist and inclusivist approaches. The former considers them as "two distinct stages of a phased process, undertaken separately and under different conditions", while the latter argues that "they are mutually reinforcing and capable of operating simultaneously" (Smoljan, 2003:233). The inclusivist approach with an expanding consensus contends that development activities are consistent with and even constitutive of the normative values and goals of peacebuilding. In this way, they contrive development within the definitional ambit of peacebuilding to articulate a seamless linkage between them such that they are no longer alienated or viewed as external imposition on peacebuilding. Therefore, it is important to link development and peace initiatives with each other so that they simultaneously address the material conditions of violence (lack of opportunities) and empower people to resolve their conflicts peacefully (Leonhardt, 2000:242)

Development is not a set of policies or programs or result. It is a process that can be defined as "an upward directional movement of society from lesser to greater levels of energy, efficiency, equality, productivity, complexity, comprehension, creativity, mastery, enjoyment and accomplishment" (Jacobs et al., 1997:10). Development as a driving force is centred on human capacity. It is a process through which people create and recreate themselves into higher level of perfection and realization of all their latent capabilities. Thus, development theory overtly or covertly explains the dynamics of the process by which economic, political and social conditions impact on peace advancement. A corollary to this is that "whatever we are doing in the business of development is a form of conflict prevention or peacebuilding (Uvin, 2002:6), and presupposes that all peacebuilding and development programmes in a conflict region should contribute to the wider peace process" (Paffenholz et al, 2005: 2).

The interrelatedness and interdependence of development and peacebuilding become more apparent and visible in a fragile and conflict affected society like the Niger Delta, which is synonymous with vicious circles of violence and poverty. Such conflict that has development dimension underscores the notion that development that is people oriented is deeply intertwined with sustainable peacebuilding (Paffenholz et al., 2005:2). On the contrary, in the past fifty years there has been an increase in per–capita income yet there is an upsurge of violent armed conflict in Africa and the South generally (Collier et al., 2002:521). This has led Kenneth Bush to draw a logical conclusion that "If development equals peace, then conflict should decrease as a country or region develops" (Bush, 2009:13). However, he argues that "this does not always happen. In fact, we often see that violence increases as the living

conditions for some groups in a region improve. In many cases, development itself creates conflict" (Bush, 2009:13). Scot Gates (2002) puts this in perspective when he submitted that economic growth generates political instability and an increased risk of armed conflict in very poor economies, but decreases this risk in richer economies. Similarly, reinforcing this contention "is a tacit belief that while underdevelopment induces conflict, development is somehow conflict free" (Stedman, 1995:19). Lack of development or mal-development in poor and developing countries cannot be extricated from the causes of violent conflict. The interactive relationship between development and peacebuilding has also reinforced the contention that the former sustains peacebuilding. This conviction tends to underscore the efficacy of economic development (human capital and infrastructure) as a major component in the peacebuilding processes.

The argument, therefore, is that development activity in a post conflict society without political will for effective governance and security will not engender sustainable peace. Taken in this sense, the determinant link between development and peacebuilding in the Niger Delta region is governance, which according to Zartman (1997) "is conflict management" (cited in Zartman, 2000:3) which implies the ability of the State to mainstream development and peacebuilding in order to harness the productive potentials of development to meet the demand on a number of issues. More often than not, one is led to argue that the interaction of development or improvement of economic well-being with the wealth of a people promote peace. Hence, "no changes in development practice are required – only more of it" (Uvin, 2002:5).

Delta State: A conflict profile

Until 1991, Delta State, situated predominantly in the heart of the Niger Delta Region was part of the defunct Bendel State which was split into Edo and Delta States. The population of the State is estimated at 4.2 million (NPC, 2006 Census) and disproportionately spread among its 25 Local Government Areas (LGAs) in the three Senatorial Districts. The State with a land area of 17,440sq kilometres has about 40 percent of this area located in the riverine terrain. The State is bounded to south-west by the Atlantic Ocean, shares boundaries with Edo State to the north, Ondo State to the north-west, Anambra and Rivers States to the east and south-east respectively, and Bayelsa State to the south. The State is without high lands or hills. The terrain is generally on a low level above the sea, generally rainy in climate with rich forests for a variety of agricultural products all year round. It also has wide coastal belts inter-laced with river, rivulets and streams, and ponds.

The State has a considerable share of the natural resources associated with the Niger Delta. It is the single largest producer of oil and gas in Nigeria and therefore in the Niger Delia Region, accounting for at least 30 percent of both on-shore and off-shore production country-wide. The possible benefits from these natural resources are, however vitiated by the peculiar problems of the region arising largely from a history of gross neglect by governments, from underdevelopment, exploitation of the forests and riverine terrain, exploration of petroleum products both on-shore and off- shore,

and the degradation and pollution of land, rivers, sea and the atmosphere by oil spills and gas flaring. The characteristics of the terrain coupled with the exploitation of petroleum products by the oil industry have made Delta State to be prone to ecological problems of erosion, subsidence, loss of aquatic life, among others.

Arising from the historical, geopolitical and social characteristics of Delta State, and its pivotal location in the political economy of the Niger Delta Region and Nigeria at large, there are numerous factors militating against the State's speedy development. The natural difficult terrain of the Niger Delta has been made worse by the activities of the oil industry and related economic activities in the Region. In addition, the obnoxious laws enacted for administering the political economy of the Niger Delta serve as an overbearing constraint to the development and progress of the State.

Until recently, the operations of oil companies especially with regard to the relationship with the communities in the areas of employment of indigenes, local content and payments for compensation has created inter-community and intra-community disputes, and these have given rise to occasional breakdown of law and order and commission of heinous crimes. As a consequence, the management of some oil companies, especially Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) and Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL), have evolved several measures to improve on their record in the area of community development to establish new strategies and policy options for better business outcomes (Faleti, 2004). For instance, SPDC in Nigeria jettisoned the sustainable development management framework launched in 1999 (Tangen 2003:11), to redefine it social engagements with the host communities in a Global Memoranda of Understanding (GMoU) in 2005. Chevron (Nigeria) Limited evolved a GMoU with governance structure of Regional Development Council to provide leadership role through trust management committee of some communities. The key strength of GMoU is the dramatic shift in corporate social responsibility towards projects and programmes that promote sustainable development from handout of cash and other compensations (Aiyede, 2006:138) and give greater community ownership of the development process.

However, the traditional investors in the oil and gas industry and new economic actors tend to avoid the core geographical area of Delta State because of persistent restiveness by the communities, youth militancy, insecurity and oil theft. The restructuring and relocation of some multinational oil companies outside the State, which provided vital and the much needed employment and valuable revenue, robbed the people and communities of the trickle down of the industry for local content, capacity building, value addition to the economic and social life, and the economies of scale for businesses and the environment. For instance, the restructuring programme of SPDC tagged 'securing our future' (SOFU) which started in 2000, has culminated in the divestment of its equity, loss of employment (direct and contract staff) and loss of valuable revenue estimated at about N5 billion annually accruing to the state from pay as you earn (PAYE) tax. It will suffice that one of the successor companies, Nigerian Petroleum Development Company (NPDC), is operating from the head office in Benin, Edo State.

Over the past fifteen years, Delta State has been confronted with a number of ongoing conflict situations. These have included: a series of intra-community conflicts (Uzere,

Irri, Ugborodo, youth violence in Uvwie communities of Effurun and Ekpan); inter-community conflicts or boundary disputes (Emuhu/Umunede, Uvwie/Warri South LGAs, Uvwie/Okpe LGAs, Uvwie/Udu LGAs, Ethiope West/ Warri North LGAs, Aniocha South/Aniocha North, Aladja/Ogbe-Ijo, Gberegor/Esaba, Obetim community agitation for excision from Ndokwa East LGA and merger with Ndokwa West LGA, Aniocha South/Ndokwa West land dispute); ethnic conflicts (Ijaw /Itsekiri/Urhobo) in Warri area; violent conflicts entailing horrendous destruction of lives and properties (Odimodi and Ogulagha, between Emedi and Igbide); political violence before and after elections (local and state government); and, finally, militancy and violent attacks on oil corporations and facilities. In addition, there are a number of insecurity situations that are characterized as conflict prone (kidnapping, crime- oil theft and piracy).

By the sheer quantum of its oil and gas production, the State occupies a prime position in the production of the national wealth (crude oil and gas production). Thus, the' petroleum-related problems facing the Niger Delta therefore confronts Delta State much more harshly than the other States. For instance it was and has been a hotbed of ethnic conflicts, resource control struggle, illegal economic activities (illegal bunkering and refineries) and have witnessed massive confrontations between the militants and Government security agents including the invasion of Okerenkoko by Joint Task Force (JTF) in 2003 and 2006, and the invasion of Tompolo's Camp IV in Gbaramatu territory in May, 2009. In addition, most prominent militant actors in the Movement of the Emancipation of Niger Delta's (MEND's) family are domiciled in the creeks of the State.

There is the fear of minority nationalities in the governance of Delta State and a general situation of a frustrated population making it easy to acquire the structures of' ethnic polarisation, communal suspicion, anti-establishment agitation and hostility, all of which tend to create a situation of instability and an impediment to development. For instance, in 2013, Ijaw militant youths were reported to have attacked Itsekiri creek communities in Warri North Council Area, unleashing terror and completely sacking Ajamita, Udo, Gbokoda, Obaghoro and Ayerode-Zion on the Benin River axis. The attacks were precipitated on the imminent fear that the Egbema people would be denied the position of the Chairman in the October 2014, local council elections. The Egbema militant youths alleged complete neglect, political imbalance and marginalization in terms of political and civil service appointments in spite of the Ijaw overwhelming majority. For one thing, the attacks could be attributed to a combination of the dynamism of the Warri conflict and leadership failure to cultivate and develop cordial relations, germane to community mobilization for peacebuilding (Jarikre, 2014).

In addition, there is the recurrent friction between the Itsekiri and Ijaw on the one hand, and Itsekiri and the Urhobo in Warri on the other, over claims of ownership of, or sovereignty over their ancient homelands and natural resources. A case in point is the ethnic contentions of naming Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation's (NNPC) $16 billion Export Processing Zone (EPZ) project after Ogidigben, an Itsekiri community. The agitations of Ijaw and Ilaje stakeholders have frustrated the efforts of the State government and NNPC to commence operation with the ground breaking ceremony.

The emerging contentious issues appear to assume the character and trajectory of the location of Warri South-West Local Government Council headquarter in 1997.

Peacebuilding in Practice: the Three-Point-Agenda
To appreciate the significance of conceptualizing the three-point-agenda in 2007 by the Uduaghan Administration of Delta State, Nigeria, some critical social problems and challenges that were very evident are worthy of note. First, the prolonged years of military dictatorship and authoritarianism entrenched institutional and endemic abuse of rights and freedom which culminated in pent-up anger that escalated under the civilian democratic rule since 1999, over control of natural resources. The years of violent conflicts have perpetuated a culture of violence in the Niger Delta Region (Princeton Lyman in Asuni, 2009:1). Also critical is the fact that in spite of the massive wealth generated from communities in the region through oil and gas exploration, there are indicators of underdevelopment, excruciating poverty and impoverishment (Okoh, 2007:97), pollution, industrial hazards, environmental degradation, oil spills, gas flaring, deprivation and repression (UNDP, 2006:6; Omofonwan and Odia, 2009:26; Asuni, 2009:6). Consequently, since 1999, frustrations among oil bearing communities had continued to overflow, giving rise to waves of youth restiveness and armed resistance against the Nigerian State and oil companies operating in the area (Ikelegbe, 2005). Since then the murky unrest had grown into major insurgency (Asuni, 2009:3), until the Presidential proclamation of amnesty in 2009. However, the complex mix of grievance, protest, greed, crime and political collusion has made the Niger Delta conflict intractable.

These conflict trajectories arising from the socio-economic and political realities impose upon the State Government a leadership role in the process of, and responsibility for, reversing the causes of underdevelopment- wide-spread poverty, inadequate infrastructure and basic utilities, as well as high rate of militancy, insecurity and crime. It is in this sense that Zartman (1997) asserted that governance is conflict management, when faced with the responsibility of managing the conflicting demands of the various strata in the State. The importance of these factors of conflict underscores why governance in the State should adopt a strategic alertness about its policies, pronouncements, decisions and actions in a culturally heterogeneous State like Delta State. This is intended to mitigate the threat to peace and development as a result of mutual suspicions and distrust among the various ethnic groups.

The challenge of public safety and security from (kidnap, armed robbery attacks and piracy, assault on oil facilities), the state of decadence and near absence of social infrastructure (such as of functional/effective education system, public healthcare system), and economic well being of the citizenry were prevalent in the State, when the Uduaghan administration assumed office in 2007. No doubt, as studies such as Bush (2009), Katja (2007), Tschirigi (2003), Uvin (2002) and Stedman (1995) have shown, the absence of social infrastructure and economic well being of a society are inextricably linked to the level of security. Taking into cognizance the socio-economic and political situation in the Niger Delta, the Government conceptualized the three-point agenda – peace and security, human capital development and infrastructure development, as a policy option to ensure public safety, respond to the problem of

insecurity and eliminate the root cause of such crimes and intent. At the core of this agenda is the attainment of economic growth that will guarantee a peaceful atmosphere (Uduaghan, 2013).

Peace and security, human capital and infrastructure development are the essential ingredient, components and pivot on which the wheel of peacebuilding revolves in the Niger Delta. Well educated, healthy people, who are adequately housed, constitute a productive and contented workforce. Combine this with food security and availability of essential infrastructure and you have the conditions for long term socio- economic development. Thus, the question that arises from Government assumption is whether the three-point-agenda has achieved its peacebuilding objectives or is it a mere symbolic agenda that buttresses the cares and worries of Udugahan's administration, that lack the political will to initiate concrete policy outcomes.

Peace and Security
Prior to the three point agenda, the challenges of peace and security were, however, brought to the front burner of governance and adopted as state policy in two prongs by the Ibori Administration. First, as an administrative structure designed to galvanize the peace and security initiatives. The administrative structure include the appointment of a Commissioner for Special Duties on Inter Ethnic and Conflict Resolution, establishment of 12 Community Development Committees (CDC) in the Warri conflict area, creation of Waterways Security Committee, three Zonal Security Committees, Peace and Security Committees at the Local Government level. Second, provision of financial assistance in terms of donating operational facilities/equipment and welfare for personnel of federal government controlled security agencies (Police, Army and Nigeria Navy, State Security Service (SSS) and the Joint Task Force (JTF)) in the State. To sustain the culture of support to security agencies initiated by previous administrations, the Uduaghan administration provided armoured personnel carrier (APC) and hundreds of security vans equipped with modern communication gadgets. It was observed from data collected that the support of the State Government to the security agencies culminated in effective policing by Joint Patrol Teams, which in turn led to crime (bank, high and armed robbery, kidnapping) reduction in the State and drastically reduced breaches of the peace (Personal communication, 2014; Aziken, 2014).

The initiator governor of the three point agenda, Emmanuel Uduaghan was a key actor, in the government he succeeded. He served as Secretary to State Government (2003 -2007), which responsibilities included scribe to both the State Executive and Security Councils. This presupposes that he had, as it were, acquired a fundamental knowledge of policies (the strength, weaknesses and opportunities of policies) adopted by the previous administration, that were germane to the challenges of peace and security in the State. Thus, upon assumption of office in 2007, the administration redefined and re-conceptualized the security policies and strategies to strengthen the structure of security apparatus in order to deepen government hold in the sensitive area of peace and security. For instance, to reduce the incidences of bureaucratic bottlenecks that often inhibit security operations the administration restructured the peace and security architecture and made some critical appointments. Among these

were the replacement of the Office of the Commissioner Special Duties for Inter Ethnic Relations and Conflict Resolution with a Ministry of Peace and Security, and appointment of a Peace Consultant with the mandate to preside over most cases of communal conflicts and reports directly to the Governor. He also appointed a Special Adviser on Land Security, two Special Advisers (Security), three Senior Special Assistants, Community Relations and inaugurated 50-Member Committee each of women and youths with membership drawn from all the Local Government Areas in the State (Delta State Government: Our Agenda, 2011).

Using a multi-track approach to galvanize grassroot mobilization, the government embarked on constructive engagement of traditional institutions and faith based organizations (FBO). Thus, the traditional institutions under the aegis of Traditional Rulers Council and Community Development Committee/Centres, have been funded by government to provide platform for interaction and grassroot mobilization for sundry matters, including peace and security. Similarly, recognizing the efficacy of faith-based organizations as vital agencies for social mobilization and cohesion, the government appointed a special adviser on religious matters, to mobilize the various FBO (Christian and Moslem faithful) to uphold the tenets of their religion and propagate the ideals of love, harmony and peaceful co-existence (Delta State Government: Our Agenda, 2008).

To tackle the increased incidence of hostage taking, oil theft, vandalization of oil facilities, militancy and piracy in creek and riverine communities, the administration restructured and reinvigorated the Waterways Security Committee. The Waterways Security Committee is saddled with the task of addressing the pertinent maritime peace and security issues. To cater for the peace and security needs of the upland area, Government established the vigilante groups. The Waterway Security Committee with other community security groups like the vigilante and Youth Committee are involved in un-armed surveillance activities to provide vital information for the law enforcement agencies to prevent pipeline vandalisation or any criminal action in the water ways. The Youth Committees are charged with the proactive responsibilities of grassroot monitoring of youth activism and general information gathering on peace and security in their localities (Uduaghan, 2013).

As part of the administration strategy to develop the security infrastructure in the State, security infrastructure such as street lights have been installed in major cities in the State, especially Asaba and Warri. It is essential to note that street lighting in other climes is designed as social infrastructure basically for aesthetic values and beautification. However, in the Niger Delta and indeed Nigeria, where electricity supply is a scare social service and infrastructure, street lights are provided at enormous cost by generating set powered by diesel (Delta State Government: Our Agenda, 2008)

The pronouncement on the ban of *okada* by the government was a critical decision which the administration had pursued with dodged determination irrespective of hue and cry that trailed the decision. *Okada* (as it is popularly called) is a transport system where motorbike riders convey commuters to their destination for a fee. This mode of transportation began in 1980s and reached its peak in this millennium, as a result of increased unemployment, congested traffic, bad roads and above all the absence of

good transportation infrastructure/system. However, in spite of the benefits of it being a viable option due to the aforementioned problems, Government was constrained to ban the use of *okada* as criminals and social miscreants used it to commit and perpetuate crimes such as robbery, car and hand bag snatching, etc. this was based on the relative ease of evading security agents with motorbikes compared to other means of transportation (Personal Communication, 2014; Delta State Government Our Agenda, 2012).

Human Capital Development

Labour economists consider human capital as a crucial component of aggregate wealth especially in contemporary knowledge-based economy. Accordingly, they have viewed human capital as a set of skills/characteristics that increases worker productivity (Becker, 1992) and capacity to adapt in order to deal with disequilibrium situations or situations in which there is a changing environment (Shultz, 1971). The human development index (HDI) in the Niger Delta remains at a low value of 0.564 (with 1 being the highest score) in relation to longevity of life, knowledge and a decent standard of living (UNDP, 2006). Consequently, this scenario reinforces the siege mentality amongst the youths who see conflict as a strategy to escape deprivation. Thus, both physical infrastructure and human capital are critical components of the peace and security architecture in the Niger Delta, taking into consideration youth restiveness, demographic prognosis and labour migration (Purviņš, Rusakova, 2007).
.
Previous administrative measures to address the gamut of problem in relation to restiveness in the Niger Delta, through interventions, reports, and plans by government (federal, state and local), oil companies, NGOs, and bilateral and multilateral agencies appeared to have been limited to economic and environmental component of the problem and not human centred. According to UNDP (*NDHD Report*, 2006), they are developmental artefacts (innovations, industries, social and physical infrastructure). Human capital development explains how education, health care, professional qualification and other activities impact on people to be more economically efficient.

The three point agenda underscores the importance of human capital development in the quest for inclusive sustainable development. Human capital development as contrived in the three point agenda involves strategic government policies and expenditure in the areas of education, health care and economic empowerment to affect the human capital of the State. For instance, the government provides free medical services in public hospitals and health care centres throughout the period of pregnancy to the point of delivery. Also, the mother is guaranteed free post natal care for the first six weeks after delivery, and for the new born child, a free medical coverage is provided for the first five years of life. The free services are complemented with the abundance of specialists in many disciplines of maternal and child health. Under the free rural health scheme, government has provided free surgical treatment to more than twenty thousand persons in over 90 communities across the state. Although, there is no geriatrics centre/ facilities in the public hospitals, the government had not jettisoned the health need of the aged as there is free medical services (free

quality drug, laboratory investigations and consultation) for persons of 60 years and above. In the education sector, the government has been responsible for the payment of examination fees for final year secondary students, bursary and scholarship to students in tertiary institutions. Noteworthy, is the scholarship awarded to boost intellectual fecundity- graduate with first class honours degree receive N5m each, with over 200 beneficiaries.

The economic empowerment prong of the human capacity development strategy includes the micro credit facilities and skill acquisition programme. Under the former, funds and economic opportunities is provided for the unemployed, urban working poor, rural population especially the youths, women and physically challenged persons, to establish small and medium scale enterprises. These groups of persons are encouraged to form cluster of cooperative societies/groups of commercial activities at the cottage level. Beneficiaries include 111,312 persons spread across 10,000 clusters, who are involved in the cottage industry, trading, agriculture and service industry sectors. The later comprises the training of youths, through skills acquisition centres and Youth Empowerment Programme and Farmer's Support Programme (YETA-FSP) (YEP). To this end, funds and training have been provided not only for the unemployed but also underfunded farmers, to establish their own farms in diverse areas of farming, including livestock, poultry and aquaculture.

Infrastructure Development
As part of the strategies to achieve one prong of the three point agenda, the government has embarked on the development of social and economic infrastructure in the state. According to a government document posted on its website, the government has turned the entire state into a huge construction site as it vigorously pursued its infrastructure development programme. To this end, there has been a steady annual increase in capital expenditure proposal in budgetary estimates since 2007, for the development of physical/transport, industrial, health, education and power infrastructure. A catalogue of some of the key projects include: Asaba – Ughelli road dualization, Koko – Ugbenu road dualization, Effurun – Osubi – Eku road dualization, trans Warri – Ode-Itsekiri road and bridge, independent power project (IPP) in Ogharefe, information and communication technology (ICT) recreation park in Asaba, Asaba International Airport, second runway and expansion of Osubi-Warri Airport, Koko Port free trade zone, Export Processing Zone Ogidigben, renovation of dilapidated hospitals and health centres, schools and building and equipping new ones, Warri Industrial/Business Park, etc. In the area of education and health sector, the administration, for instance, has built 13 model secondary and 54 model primary schools as well as remodeled 18,000 classroms. Most general hospitals were upgraded to specialist hospitals with state of the art laboratory and diagnostics equipment. Notably, decayed infrastructure with fall in standard *Eku Specialist Hospital,* once owned and managed by the Baptist Convention, have been taken over and revitalized with modern physical and health facilities by the Government. In addition, to enhance medical tourism and reduce capital flight, the administration completed a tertiary health facility (Delta State University Teaching Hospital, Oghara) with state of the art health facilities (Uduaghan, 2013; Aziken, 2014).

On the list of development infrastructure, two projects are the flagships. These are the Warri Industrial Business Park (WIBP) and Asaba International Airport. The Warri Industrial Business Park (WIBP) project is a twin designed economic space for industrial and business ventures, to provide world-class infrastructure for businesses - Manufacturing, Commercial, Logistics, Oil &Gas including residential and leisure purposes. The land space of WIBP is approximately 329 hectares, is about eight kilometers from the Airport at Osubi, near Warri and less than two kilometres from the seaport (Ojefia, 2009). The oil rich city of Warri had once offered diverse attractions in the area of breathe taking coastline container port and world class investment opportunities which have already convinced a number of leading international actors like Shell Petroleum Development Company, Chevron, Elf, Nigeria Oil Agip Company (NOAC) and other oil and gas support services companies. The Asaba International Airport is aimed at stimulating economic activities around Asaba and indeed the whole State. It will also facilitate optimal usage of the proposed Asaba Business District. In addition, it will open up commercial activities for traders and businesses across the State and serve as a gateway to the eastern commercial centre, especially Onitsha market (Uduaghan, 2013).

Conclusion

Given the nature of Delta State, with the multi-staged (community, local government and ethnic groups) security context, with the regional (delta-wide) waves of militancy and state intervention institutions (DESOPADEC) with specific mandate and context, the power of political agenda setting in relation to peacebuilding, provides explanation of how the active and visible role of governance can contribute to peacebuilding and conflict prevention. The idea of both political agenda setting and peacebuilding are political driven social change, but their application have not been considered vis-à-vis as advocacy and intervention that are strategic in mitigating conflict and promoting peace in conflict prone societies. In the context of Delta State, the application of the three-point-agenda to pursue peacebuilding goals and outcomes, are essential tools for ensuring and strengthening resilience, social cohesion and human security in a conflict affected or high risk societies (context) or experiencing and recovering from violent and armed conflict.

The current economic policy and mantra of Delta beyond oil was contrived by the Uduaghan administration in 2012, as a consequence of a deliberate attempt to secure the future devoid of oil and gas industry, started by the same administration as a complimentary strategy to the three-point-agenda. Although, aimed at divesting it revenue base from a mono-economy of oil and gas, the thrust of the policy is not strictly predicated on intensive taxation of every sector but introducing a new income tax regime as a means to counter a shortfall of oil revenue.. Taxes and royalties are major sources of government revenue world over when, but in this clime where government own and control the production and activities of the oil industry, government sources of revenue is not limited to mining taxes and royalties but include profit making from the entire operation. A critical evaluation of the current political tax policy and tax regimes may be hard to quantify because it is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, harsh tax regimes and policies are likely to discourage bilateral and multilateral investors, especially when government is not committed to growing

the economy through the private investor by building social infrastructure and providing enabling environment based on policy directions.

No doubt, there are strong criticisms on the level of development in relation to the ritual of annual budgetary allocation of funds for the projects, completion timeline and outcomes in terms of physical transformation of the state and social infrastructure build-up that are investment friendly. The budgetary allocation to projects, actual expenditure and what is owed to contractors between 2007 and 2015 has become a complex one, the detailed analysis is beyond the scope of the discourse. What is apparent from the survey is that, the level of project completion does not appear to significantly impact on the economic and social wellbeing of the people as well as the direct foreign investment drive by State government.

The direct foreign investment drive was a measure to grow the state GDP, one way to do this was to encourage rapid infrastructure development. The KOKO Export free Zone was created to attract $16 billion direct foreign investment and 500,000 jobs in petrochemical and fertilizer sector. Asaba airport was established to enable foreign investor fly into the state. Asaba – Ughelli dual carriage project is being implemented to offer easy and fast transportation from Asaba airport to the KOKO Export free Zone. Integrated power project was to ensure and boost power supply to the Zone. Closely related to KOKO Export free Zone for direct foreign investment is the Warri Industrial Park for attracting domestic or local investment to the economic zone. The value chain of the KOKO export free Zone and the Warri Industrial Park projects include large and medium scale industries to grow the State economy. However, at the end of the two term regime on 29 May, 2015, none of the projects including the social infrastructure support projects had been commissioned. Thus, there was no significant impact on reduction of unemployment (50,000 direct and indirect employment envisaged on completion were not achieved), improvement of social infrastructure and wealth creation. Rather, it does appear that there is an endemic tendency to keep the State as a perpetual construction site whereby the proposed project outcomes are fleeting illusions.

The three-point-agenda (peace and security, human capital and infrastructure development) in peacebuilding can be surmised as a Delta State government policy framework (2007 – 2015), to reduce and prevent the risk of insecurity and conflict or relapse to it. The framework used a range of economic and political policy framework, intervention and participatory tools to create safe spaces for prevention and transformation of violence behaviours and conflicts. Notwithstanding the fault lines identified and challenges of implementation, the three-point- agenda was germane to the strategic path of peacebuilding across all sectors and at various levels. Therefore, it generated significant peacebuilding outcomes by promoting efforts to prevent human and social insecurity, transform violent communal conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction of Warri areas, support presidential amnesty programme for demobilization and disarmament of Niger Delta militant groups, state-wide educational campaigns, inter-faith and inter-ethnic interactions, human and social development/ empowerment of youth and women groups, economic and sustainable development and dealing with environmental degradation and climate change.

The implementation of government agenda and the peacebuilding outcomes which is the thrust of this paper has provided insights into the challenges confronting the governance and the society. Since government is a continuum, the agenda of the successor regime should be generous enough to sustain the achievements with a political will to make necessary adjustment to identified weaknesses. Some of the projects and programmes of the three-point agenda are tangential to the development crisis and peacebuilding outcomes in the Niger Delta region. Therefore, since peacebuilding is predicated upon impact and outcomes, there is need to evolve a measurement scale to determine the extent that the government's agenda has impacted on the peace and conflict situation, macro and micro, and socio-political environment. Accordingly, a rigorous and extensive academic engagement to produce a robust body of empirical research is imperative.

REFERENCES

Aiyede, E. R. 2006. "The Case of Oil Exploration in Nigeria" Richter, Ingo K. Sabine Berking and Ralf Muller-Schmid (eds.) *Risk Society and the Culture of Precaution*. Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan (131 -146)

Asuni, J. B. 2009. *Security and Conflict Transformation in the Niger Delta,* SAIS. http://www.learningace.com/doc (Accessed 08/07/2012)

Asuni J. B. 2009. *Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Inc. www.cfr.org (Accessed 08/07/2012)

Aziken, Emmanuel (2014) "Uduaghan: Bringing forth Delta State" *Vanguard* Newspaper www.vanguardngr.org   January 01, 2014 Special Report
Becker G.S. (1992). Nobel lecture: The economic way of looking at life. Journal of Political Economy, 101, p. 385-409

Becker, G.S. (1993). Human capital: A theoretical and empirical analysis with special reference to education (3rd ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 101-119.

Booth, K. 1994.. *A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoritical Considertions*, Southern African Perspectives No. 30, Centre for South African Studies, University of the Western Cape.

Boutros-Ghali, B. 1992. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* Document A/47/277 - S/241111, 17 June 1992. New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations http://www.unrol. (Accessed 08/07/2011).

Bryant, J. & D. Miron (2004). "Theory and research in mass communication". *Journal of Communication,* Vol. 54, Issue 4, 662–704. Onlinelibrary.wiley.com/do1/10/1111

Bush, K. 2009. *"Aid for Peace": A handbook for Applying Peace & Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) to Peace III Projects.* INCORE: University of Ulster, United Nations University

Collier, P. E. Lauce, H. Havard, A. Hoeffler, M. Reynal – Querol,, and N. Sambanis 2003. *Breaking the Conflict trap: Civil War and Development Policy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Conteh-Morgan, E. 2005. "Peacebuilding and Human Security: A Constructivist Perspective. *International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 10, Number 1 Available on* www.gmu.edu/pgm/icar/ijps/vol.10_1/Conteh morgan_101ijps.pdf. (Accessed 14/12/2012).

Delta State Government: Our Agenda, 2011 (unpublished memo)

Faleti, A. S. 2010 "Challenges of Chevron's GMOU Implementation in Itsekri Communities of Western Niger Delta" www.ifra-nigeria.org (accessed 20/2/2013)

Gates, S. 2002 "Empirically Assessing the Causes of Civil War" Paper Presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans LA (24-27 March). http://www.colorado.edu/.../gates (Accessed 20/8/2010).

Hubert, Don. "Human Security: Safety for People in A Changing World" in R. A. Akindele and Bassey E. Ate eds. *Beyond Conflict Resolution: Managing African Security in the 21St Century.* Ibadan: Vantage Publisher, 2001. Print.

Ikelegbe, A. 2005. "State, Ethnic Militias, and Conflict in Nigeria" *Canadian Journal African Studies/Revue Canadienne des Etudes Africaine, Vol. 39, No.3.* Canadian Association of African Studies. http://www.jstor.org (Accessed 20/8/2010).

Jacobs, G; R. Macfarlene and N. Asokon. 1997. "Comprehensive Theory of Social Development". USA: International Centre for Peace and Development. http://www.icpd.org/development_theory (Accessed 20/8/2010)

Jarikre, M. 2015. "Remobilization, Rearmament and Amnesty in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria" in *Sustainable Development in Nigeria: Strategic and Innovative Options.* Deutschland: Lambert Academic Publishing.

Jarikre, M. 2012 "The military and internal security and peacebuilding process in Nigeria" Ilorin Journal of History and International Studies Vol. 3 No. 1 (167 – 186), Department of History and International Studies, University of Ilorin

Jermolajeva, E. and D. Znotiņa (2007). "Investments in the Human Capital for Sustainable Development of Latvia" http: www.regionalstudies.org

Jones, B., & Baumgartner, F. (2005). *The politics of attention. How government prioritizes attention.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Katja, S. 2007. "Human Security as Inclusive Security- Gender, Epistemology and Equality". *African Security Review, Vol. 16, No.2.* www.tandfonline.com (Accessed 24/11/2011)

Kingdon, J.W. (1995). *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies.* New York: Harper Collins College Publishers.

Klingebiel, S. 2006. "Introduction" in Stephen klingebiel (ed.) New Interfaces Between Security and Development: Changing Concepts and Approaches. Bonn:Deutsches Institu fur Entwicklungspolitik. http://www.die-gdi.de (Accessed 23/10/2011).

Leonhardt, M. 2001. "Relief Aid and Development Cooperation" in Luc Reychler and Thania Puffenholz (eds.). *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide.* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

Ojefia, I. A. (2009) "Agenda Setting, Political Slogan or Economic Growth Mechanisms:
an overview of Dr. Emmanuel Eweta Uduaghan's Three-Point Agenda in Delta State, Nigeria" Feature Article http://odili.net/nigeria.html

Okoh, R. N. 2007. "Conflict Management in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: A Participatory Approach" *African Journal on Conflict Resolution.* http://www.accord.org.za/ajcr/2005 (Accessed 20/8/2010).
Omofonmwan, S. I. and L. O. Odia. 2009. "Oil Exploitation and Conflict in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria". *Journal of Human Ecology Vol. 26, No 1.* www.krepublishers.com (Accessed 10/8/2010).

Paffenholz, T. 2005. Third-generation PCIA: Introducing the Aid for Peace Approach. in Schmelzle B. (ed) *New Trends in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment. Dialogue Series 4* Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, http://www.berghof-handbook.net (Accessed 08/07/2011).

Reychler, Luc 1997. "Democratic peacebuilding and conflict prevention", Paper for Conflict Prevention Network (CPN, European Commission) Seminar on Democracy Building and Conflict
Richmond, O. P. 2007. "Emancipatory forms of Human Security and Liberal peacebuilding" *International Journal*, Vol. 62, No 3, What kind of Security?

Afghanistan and Beyond. Pp 458-477 Canadian International Council. http://www.jstor.org (Accessed 19/7/2011).

Schattschneider, E. E. 1975. *The Semi-sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America.* Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press.

Schirch, L. 2008. "Strategic Peacebuilding: State of the Field" Peace Prints: *South Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, Vol.1, No.1* .Available from http://www.wiscomp.org/peaceprints.htm (Accessed 14/8/2011).

Schirch, L. 2005. *The Little Book of Strategic Peacebuilding* Intercourse, Pennsylvania: Good Books.

Schultz, T.W. (1971). *Investment in Human capital.* New York. The Free Press

Smoljan, J .2003. "The Relationship Between Peace-Building and Development." *Conflict, Security and Development Vol.3 No.2. New York:* Routledge.

Stedman, S.J., 1995. "Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling 'Preventive Diplomacy" *Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3.* Council on Foreign Relations http://www.jstor.org (Accessed: 14/05/2013)

Tschirgi, N. 2004. "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges" The Peacebuilding Forum. New York: International Peace Academy. www.ipacademy.org (Accessed 14/4/2010).
Tschirgi, N. 2003. "Peacebuilding as the Link between Security and   Development: Is the Window of Opportunity Closing?" *Studies in Security and Development.* New York: International Peace Academy. www.ipacademy.org (Accessed 14/4/2010).

Uduaghan, E. 2010 "Task Religious Leaders on Credible Elections, Voters Registration" *Pointer Newspaper* 14 October 2010. Asaba
Uduaghan, Emmanuel 2013. "Nigeria's Delta and Security Challenges: Using the Delta Beyond Oil strategy, a governor's approach" Being a paper presented by Delta State Governor, Emmanuel Uduaghan,CON, at the School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University, Washington, USA. www.vanguardngr.com

United Nations 2003, *Review of Technical Cooperation in the United Nations (Report of the Secretary-General).* 19 September 2003, UN Doc A/58/382 (19 September 2003) New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations https://www.un.org/en (Accessed 19/2/2012).
United Nations Development Programme 2006. *Niger Delta Human Development Report.* Lagos, Perfect Printers Ltd.

United Nations Development Programme 1995. *Human Development Report*. New York: Oxford University Press hdr.undp.org

Van Aelst, Peter and Stefaan Walgrave 2011. "Minimal or Massive? The Political Agenda– Setting Power of the Mass Media According to Different Methods" *International Journal of Press/Politics* 16(3) 295– 313 http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1940161211406727 http://ijpp.sagepub.com

Vanguard Newspaper 2013. "Foreign Investors Plan $16B Investment in Delta"4/10/2013 www.vanguardngr.com)

Uvin, P. 2002. "the Development/Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and Histoty of Changing Paradigms" Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, Vol. 1, No. 1. http://www.tandfonline.com (Accessed 20/8/2010)

Walgrave, Stefaan; Stuart Soroka and Michiel Nuytemans (2008) "The Mass Media's Political Agenda-Setting Power: A Longitudinal Analysis of Media, Parliament, and Government in Belgium (1993 to 2000)" *Comparative Political Studies* Volume XX Number X Sage Publications http://online.sagepub.com

Zartman I W. ed. 1997. *Government Management: politics and Violence in West Africa* cited in Zartman I William (2000) "Introduction: African Traditional Conflict "Medicine" in *Traditional Curses for Modern Conflicts African Conflict "Medicine"* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

Baumgartner, Frank R., & Jones, Bryan D. (1993). *Agendas and instability in American politics*.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Babatunde Andy, Asaba, Delta State.